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Abstract
In Germany, imposition of benefit cuts for non-compliant welfare recipients depends
on the policy of the local welfare agencies resulting in considerable regional variation,
expressed in milder and stricter sanction regimes. Findings from international studies
show, that benefit sanctions can substantially increase individual employment uptake.
This raises the question, whether a stricter use of sanctions will be effective in Germany.
We analyze this question by exploiting the variation of regional sanction regimes as
instrumental variables to estimate the LATE of sanctions on the individual employment
probability. A tighter sanction policy can be quite effective for non-compliant welfare
recipients.
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1 Introduction
Benefit sanctions are used as part of the unemployment insurance and public welfare
systems in many countries. Social welfare benefits have increasingly been made condi-
tional on requirements such as active search for a job or participation in active labor
market programs.1 Sanctions (or the threat to impose them) are intended to provide
incentives for benefit recipients to comply with these requirements. The empirical lit-
erature on the effects of sanctions shows that benefit cuts often increase transitions
from unemployment to employment.2 Yet, the strictness of sanctions differs consider-
ably across countries, and there is no country that imposes sanctions for a first refusal
of a job offer or a labor market program automatically (see Venn 2012). Tightening the
sanction regime, therefore, is a relevant policy option. Given the evidence for sanction
effects at the individual level, the question arises whether an intensified use of benefit
sanctions would be effective. This question has not been investigated in the literature
so far.
To answer the question, we make use of a unique data set for Germany. The case of
Germany is interesting because sanctions have become much more commonplace after
the reform of the German welfare system in 2005. The obligation to actively search for
employment and to participate in active labor market policy programs marked an impor-
tant change in Germany’s welfare policy. For the first time, welfare recipients had become
a target group of labor market activation. Benefit sanctions are now frequently imposed
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by welfare agencies in the form of a partial or a complete revocation of benefits for a
certain period of time. Welfare agencies possess a high degree of discretion in individ-
ual sanction decisions, which results in substantial regional variation of sanction rates.
While in some regions sanctions are imposed frequently, they are used rarely in other
regions.3
Exploiting this regional variation, we follow an instrumental variable approach using
information about sanctions across welfare agencies to identify the effect a stricter sanc-
tion policy would have.4 The data set for the empirical analysis combines information of
a large survey of welfare benefits recipients with administrative information, collected at
154 welfare agencies in Germany. In addition to individual information, the data provide
information on organizational aspects and strategies of the welfare agencies. In partic-
ular, we have access to survey information on the sanction strategy that is used in the
respective welfare agency. The different sanction strategies of the welfare agencies as
well as the differences in the frequency with which sanctions are actually imposed are
used to instrument the selection process at the individual level and to estimate local
average treatment effects (LATE, see Imbens and Angrist (1994)). Specifically, we esti-
mate the effect of a sanction on individuals who are not sanctioned in a welfare agency
with a moderate sanction policy, but who would be sanctioned if the agency would
change its policy and would impose sanctions more frequently. The estimated LATEs
can thus be interpreted as a measure of the effectiveness of an intensified use of benefit
sanctions.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents some details
of the German welfare system and the institutional setting of benefit sanctions. The data
used in the empirical analysis is described in Section 3. Our empirical identification strat-
egy is discussed in Section 4. In Section 5, we provide the estimation results and the final
section concludes.
2 The Germanwelfare system and its sanction scheme
The German welfare system was substantially reformed at the beginning of 2005, when
the so-called unemployment benefits II (UBII) were introduced which replaced the for-
mer unemployment assistance and social assistance. UBII are means-tested benefits that
do not depend on former earnings and cover some direct cash payments and compul-
sory social insurance contributions and costs of housing. Additional expenses for special
needs may also be covered. The means-test takes into account the wealth and income
of all individuals living in the household.5 In order to be eligible for UBII, persons have
to be aged between 15 and 64 years and be able to work for at least 15 hours per week.
It is important to note that unemployment is not a prerequisite for receipt of UBII.
Individuals who are employed but whose household income is too low are also eligi-
ble for UBII. Claimants capable of work have to register with the local welfare agency
and are obliged to participate in active labor market policy programs. UBII recipients’
rights and duties in the activation process are set out in a so-called ‘integration con-
tract’ (Eingliederungsvereinbarung), an agreement between the welfare agency and the
benefit recipient containing obligations with respect to program participation and job
search activities as well as detailing the services provided by the welfare agency. The
integration contract is usually set up after the first meeting of a UBII recipient with the
caseworker.
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The caseworker counsels and advises the UBII recipient and decides about placement
in active labor market programs. If the caseworker detects non-compliance of the UBII
recipient, the welfare agency is legally required to impose a sanction by benefit revoca-
tion (Chapters 31, 31a, 31b and 32 of Book II of the German Social Code). However,
there is discretion at the agency level whether a sanction is actually imposed or not. All
UBII recipients are informed about the possibility of sanctions in the integration contract
and each time they are assigned to a program. Yet, there is no formal warning process
when a non-compliance is detected. Although a hearing of the benefit recipient is for-
mally required before the imposition of a sanction, there is evidence that this requirement
is not implemented in practice as reported by Baethge-Kinsky et al. (2007). Hence, the
welfare agency may immediately impose a sanction. Sanctions have a duration of three
months and can be imposed for various reasons. For minor non-compliances, such as the
failure to properly report on job search activities to the welfare agency or not showing up
for an appointment with the caseworker, benefits are cut by 10%. More severe infringe-
ments (lack of job search effort, refusal to accept a suitable job offer, refusal to participate
in a program) lead to a benefit reduction of 30%. In case of repeated incidents of severe
infringements within one year, a second (60% cut) or a third sanction (100% cut) can
be imposed. A similar possibility exists in the case of repeated minor non-compliances,
where sanctions can be increased gradually by 10% up to a cut of 100%. For UBII recipi-
ents below 25 years of age, benefits can be reduced by 100% even for the first incident of
non-compliance.
3 Data
The empirical analysis is based on a unique data set that combines various different
data sources. The core of these data is a survey of UBII recipients who received benefits
in October 2006 or entered UBII receipt in the second half of 2006. These individu-
als were randomly sampled from the administrative records of the Federal Employment
Agency (FEA). The survey was conducted in 154 out of 439 German welfare agencies
(see Additional file 1: Figure S1 for an illustration of the sampled agencies). In each of the
agencies, between 100 and 300 computer-assisted telephone interviews were conducted
in the beginning of 2007 (January to April). In total, 24,563 interviews were realized.
The surveyed data include individual characteristics (e.g. gender, age, marital and par-
ent status, education, health and disability status, migration background), information on
other household members (number, age and relation to the respondent) and details con-
cerning the labor market status and history (current labor market state, former spells of
insured and minor employment, former spells of unemployment, UBII receipt, participa-
tion in active labor market policy programs). Moreover, the survey provides information
about basic skills (for example reading, writing, math and computer skills), further
qualifications (e.g. driver’s license), job search activities and information about benefit
sanctions.
Importantly, respondents were asked whether they have ever been sanctioned by their
welfare agency, and, if so, in which month the last sanction was imposed. We use this
information to construct our treatment variable and define those individuals as treated,
who report having been sanctioned for the first time and only once betweenOctober 2006
and April 2007. Since we focus on the effect of the first sanction imposed, persons with
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previous sanctions are deleted from the estimation sample. The reason is that the sec-
ond and further sanctions could be the outcome of a previous (ineffective) sanction; this
dependence would have to be dealt with in an explicitly dynamic framework. In general,
focusing on the first treatment event is a standard way of dealing with repeated entries
into treatment Sianesi (2004). Individuals who explicitly state that they have been sanc-
tioned before the sampling date are dropped from the data for the same reason.6 We only
consider the event of a sanction as a binary indicator, since precise information on the
level of the benefit cut is not available. We restrict our analysis to individuals aged 18 to
57, who were unemployed at the beginning of their respective UBII spell. Individuals aged
58 or above can opt for the so-called relieved benefit entitlement.Within this scheme they
are no longer required to actively search for employment, but remain on welfare bene-
fits until retirement age. Individuals aged 15 to 17 are subject to compulsory schooling
and cannot be expected to take up employment. The estimation sample contains 15,361
observations.7
Information on the outcome of interest (employment) is taken from administrative data
of the FEA. These administrative data contain labor market states on a monthly basis for
each individual up to October 2007, which allows to follow each sanctioned person for at
least six months after the imposition of the sanction. For a person sanctioned in January
2007, for example, we examine the labor market states from February to July 2007, for a
person sanctioned in April 2007, information on the period fromMay to October 2007 is
used.
In order to compare the sanctioned individuals with the control group, we constructed
a hypothetical sanction date for each non-sanctioned individual by drawing randomly
from a uniform distribution of sanction dates from the period of October 2006 to April
2007, i.e. the probability of receiving a (hypothetical) sanction in each of these months is
assumed to be 1/7. Given this (hypothetical) sanction date, the non-sanctioned group is
followed for six months as well.8 The economic conditions during the observation period
were quite favorable. In 2006, German GDP grew by 2.9% and in 2007 by 2.5%. However,
while the number of unemployment insurance benefit recipients decreased strongly in
2007 (yearly average of 1.253 million recipients in 2007 compared to 1.664 million in
2006), there was almost no decline in the number of UBII recipients (5.277million in 2007
compared to 5.392 million in 2006).9
The combined administrative and survey data were linked to additional data at the
agency level collected via surveys and case studies in all 154 sampled agencies in 2006
and 2007. These data include information to characterize the welfare agencies’ organi-
zational structure and their strategies for the activation of UBII recipients (for example
the number and qualification of caseworkers, type of case management, counseling
concept, placement approach, mix of active labor market policies, sanction strategy).
Furthermore, regional information was added reflecting labor market conditions, which
includes indicators for high regional unemployment, high GDP per capita and high wel-
fare dependence ratios (in each case, indicating a value higher than the third quartile
of the distribution of the respective variable across all German welfare agencies). The
regional information was measured in December 2003. The welfare ratio refers to for-
mer social assistance recipients only. It does not include former unemployment assistance
recipients. Moreover, two variables reflecting respondents’ place of residence (city district
vs. rural area, East vs. West Germany) were included.
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4 Estimation approach
4.1 The LATE estimator
For the identification of the effect of a sanction on employment, consider the linear
probability model:
Yi = Xiβ + Siθ + ui, (1)
where Yi is the binary outcome variable of interest (for example, Yi = 1 denotes employ-
ment of individual i and Yi = 0 denotes non-employment), Xi is a vector of covariates
(at individual and regional/agency level) and Si is a dummy variable indicating whether
individual i has been sanctioned (Si = 1) or not (Si = 0). Under the additional assump-
tion that the error term ui has zero mean conditional on all covariates Xi and Si, one
could apply simple OLS estimation to identify the effects of the right-hand side variables
on Yi. However, we cannot rule out that Si is endogenous in our case, i.e. it may be that
Cov(Si,ui) = 0. In this case an OLS estimate of the sanction effect on Yi would be biased.
Endogeneity of Si could be due to different reasons. For example, there could be a negative
selection process driven by motivation or other unobservable factors such that individu-
als with unfavorable characteristics are sanctioned with higher probability. As a result, the
OLS estimate of the effect of Si on Yi would be underestimated. However, there could also
be a positive selection process initiated by caseworkers if those with unfavorable charac-
teristics are not activated and thus not sanctioned. A positive selection of this kind would
result in an overestimated effect of Si on Yi. Hence, the bias of a simple OLS estimation is
undetermined ex-ante.
To overcome the potential endogeneity of Si, we use an instrumental variable approach
to estimate the sanction effect on the outcome variable Yi. Specifically, we consider
a binary instrument Z such that the first stage equation of a two-stage least squares
estimator can be written as:
Si = Ziδ + Xiα + i, (2)
where Xi is the same vector of covariates as in Equation 1 and i is an error term with zero
conditional mean. We allow the error terms i and ui to be correlated across observations
from the same agency. Under this specification, the two-stage least squares estimator pro-
vides an estimate of θ in Equation 1 that can be interpreted as a local average treatment
effect (LATE, see Imbens and Angrist (1994)). It measures the impact of a benefit cut
on those individuals, who get a sanction when Z changes its value from 0 to 1. For the
instrument Z, we use two different variables:
1. the sanction strategy of welfare agencies as reported by the agency managers
(denoted as Z1) and
2. the actually observed sanction rate within the agencies (denoted as Z2).
Welfare agencies play a crucial role for the use of sanctions, since they have substan-
tial discretion. Whether or not a sanction is actually imposed, depends not only on the
detected infringement, but also on the general sanction policy of the welfare agency. Some
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agencies have a high affinity for sanctions, while other agencies are more reserved. An
important element for the agencies’ management in implementing a strategy is the defini-
tion of local guidelines (verhaltenslenkendeWeisungen) for caseworkers. These guidelines
are issued to control caseworker behavior in general. Specifically, in some agencies they
may be used in order to induce caseworkers to impose sanctions frequently. Other wel-
fare agencies might follow a milder sanction policy and refrain from encouraging or even
discourage caseworkers from imposing sanctions. Therefore, the sanction strategy influ-
ences caseworkers’ actions and, consequently, creates variation in the use of sanctions
across welfare agencies.
In the surveys and case studies at agency level described in Section 3, agency managers
were asked about the use and importance of sanctions within their agencies. The answers
of managers were classified as depicted in Table 1. The distribution of answers makes
clear that benefit sanctions are valued differently across welfare agencies. While 41 of
the 154 agencies in our sample use sanctions only to comply with legal requirements,
other agencies either apply sanctions more frequently, perhaps even when minor non-
compliances of clients are detected, or less frequently, so that not all infringements are
punished. The agency will therefore have an impact on the individual probability of being
sanctioned.
Option a) of Table 1 differentiates between agencies that strategically impose sanctions
with high incidence as opposed to agencies that do not. We use this differentiation to
specify our first instrument Z1, which has value one if an individual is registered at an
agency that frequently imposes sanctions as part of its activation strategy and which is
zero otherwise, i.e. if the welfare agency is classified into one of the options b) to g) of
Table 1. Using Z1 as an instrument, the estimate of θ depicts the LATE of a sanction
on those individuals who are sanctioned in an agency that frequently imposes sanctions
and who would not be sanctioned in another (more reserved) agency. In other words, it
measures the impact of a sanction on those individuals who would be sanctioned if the
welfare agency decided to change its sanction strategy from a more reserved one to a
strict one. Thus, this LATE can be interpreted as an estimate of a more intensive use of
sanctions.
For our alternative instrument Z2, we make use of the actually observed sanction rates
within the agencies. The sanction rate of an agency is defined to be the share of individu-
als registered at the respective agency who received a benefit cut between October 2006
and April 2007. To obtain a binary instrument, we differentiate between agencies with
a sanction rate above the median (Z2 = 1) and agencies with a sanction rate below the
median (Z2 = 0). Under this specification, we estimate the LATE of a sanction on those
individuals, who would be sanctioned, if the agency decided to increase the sanction rate
Table 1 The use of sanctions in welfare agencies (number of agencies in brackets)
a) Sanctions are part of the activation strategy and applied frequently (32)
b) Sanctions are supported but are not part of the activation strategy (41)
c) Sanctions are used to comply with legal requirements (41)
d) Sanctions are regarded sceptically, but nevertheless are used (21)
e) Sanctions have no special role (neither positively nor negatively) (12)
f) Sanctions are rarely used (5)
g) Sanctions are used for general monitoring purposes, but are not regarded as useful in single cases (2)
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from below to above the median level. Again, this effect can be interpreted as an estimate
of a more intensive use of sanctions.
No matter which instrument Z is used, the identification of a LATE depends on three
conditions:
1. Z is a valid instrument, i.e. Cov(Zi,ui) = 0 and Zi is partially correlated with Si
once it is controlled for Xi.
2. The probability of being sanctioned changes with the value of Z.
3. Monotonicity: Individuals that are sanctioned in agencies of the type Z = 0must
also be sanctioned in agencies of the type Z = 1. And those individuals who are not
sanctioned under Z = 1 should not be sanctioned under Z = 0 either.
4.2 Plausibility of the LATE assumptions
In the following, we discuss these conditions referring to instrument Z1, the sanction
strategy of welfare agencies. A similar reasoning also applies for instrument Z2. The
monotonicity assumption (condition 3) is not testable (see Imbens and Angrist (1994),
p. 469), but it is very likely to hold in our case due to the distinction of more and less
severe infringements in the German Social Code (see Section 2 above). If a sanction is
imposed on an individual who is registered at an agency which rarely uses sanctions, the
non-compliance must have been severe and should also be punished in an agency that
uses sanctions frequently. Similarly, if an agency that sanctions frequently does not have
a reason to sanction an individual for a particular infringement, an agency which rarely
uses sanctions should not have a reason, either. Condition 2) is also satisfied. As will be
shown in more detail in Section 5, the sanction rate is indeed larger in agencies that fre-
quently impose sanctions as part of their activation strategy. Therefore, the probability of
an individual getting a sanction increases when Z1 changes its value from zero to one.
Condition 1),Cov(Z1,ui) = 0, requires, that Z1 has no direct effect on Yi. A direct effect
would exist if individuals changed their behavior due to the actual realization of Z1. This,
however, can be perceived to be highly unlikely. The welfare agency’s sanction strategy is
not communicated to its clients. Hence, individuals do not knowwhether or not sanctions
are used more frequently in their agency than in another agency. They therefore lack
information to draw comparisons with other agencies, whose strategies are even more
difficult to find out. Thus, there should not be any behavioral response of individuals to
the sanction strategy of the welfare agency.
A possible counterexample is provided by Lalive et al. (2005) and Arni et al. (2013).
For the Swiss case, these authors argue that monitoring intensity and warnings may have
a positive effect on the exit rate from unemployment, independently of actual sanctions
being imposed. If monitoring intensity and warnings are associated with higher sanction
intensity, it would be difficult to identify the effect of actual sanctions without informa-
tion on monitoring and warnings. It may appear that a positive association is not unlikely,
as a first infraction may result in an informal warning and only the second or later infrac-
tion in an actual sanction if the agency pursues a tough sanction strategy. However, the
practice of imposing sanctions in Germany differs from the Swiss case. There is no formal
warning process when non-compliance is detected. Thus, the degree of caseworker dis-
cretion is higher and warnings may or may not be given only informally. The qualitative
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study by (Baethge-Kinsky et al. (2007): 52) suggests that informal warnings are used reg-
ularly but remain an abstract threat and are followed by the imposition of a sanction only
in relatively few cases. As a consequence, it appears that UBII recipients can learn little
about their agency’s sanction policy from informal warnings given during the monitoring
process.
If UBII recipients were aware of the sanction strategies of the agencies, the only way to
avoid a tough sanction regime for a (non-cooperative) person registered at an agency that
frequently imposes sanctions would be to move to another region, since individuals are
forced to register with the agency at the place of residence. However, financial constraints
are likely to prevent UBII recipients from moving. In addition, welfare agencies are quite
reluctant to support a move, since they would have to pay (most of ) the costs.
It is also unlikely that the socio-demographic composition of the UBII recipients or
the labor market situation drives an agency to adopt a certain sanction strategy. To
check this, we have predicted the instrument propensity scores based on the variables
considered in the first stage regressions.10 The instrument propensity score depicts
the probability of the instrumental variable to become 1, i.e. Pr(Zj = 1|X) with j ∈
{1, 2}. Figures 1 and 2 plot the conditional distributions for persons living in welfare
agencies with Zj = 1 and persons living in welfare agencies with Zj = 0. Indepen-
dently of the instrumental variable chosen, it becomes obvious that for both groups
the distributions are almost identical, indicating that the chosen instruments are as
good as randomly assigned across subpopulations and provide a valid means to identify
causal effects.
In addition, as can be seen from Additional file 1: Figure S2, agencies that sanction
frequently and agencies that do not appear to be distributed more or less randomly across
the sampled regions. In many cases, agencies that sanction frequently and non-frequently
directly border each other. In the city of Berlin, for example, five welfare agencies are
sampled. Two of them use sanctions frequently, while three do not. Since Berlin can be
Figure 1 Instrument propensity score for Z1.
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Figure 2 Instrument propensity score for Z2.
regarded as a single labor market, which is identical for all five agencies within the city,
and since the composition of UBII recipients in these five agencies is quite similar, it is
unlikely that the sanction strategy of an agency depends on the labor market state or
the sociodemographic characteristics of the UBII recipients. A similar picture arises with
respect to the actually observed sanction rates within the agencies (see Additional file 1:
Figure S3).
To support the argumentation that sanction strategy or aggregate sanction rate are inde-
pendent of local economic performance or the set-up of the activation process in general,
we have regressed both instruments Z1 and Z2 on
1. a characterization describing the organizational set-up of the counseling process,
2. a number of regional variables intended to characterize the economic performance
of the local labor market and
3. both.
Here, the counseling process is classified into four categories, where themain categories
1 and 2 distinguish between a specialized and a generalized kind of case management.
In the first type, case managers specialize in counseling certain groups of UBII recipi-
ents, for example lone mothers, migrants and young UBII recipients. In the second type,
case managers counsel all UBII recipients without distinction. The subcategories a and
b denote whether placement in the labor market is part of the case management process
or not. Subcategory a denotes that it is not integrated and therefore conducted by other
staff of the agency. In subcategory b, case managers are also responsible for placement
questions. The regional variables include dummy variables for city districts, East Ger-
many, the unemployment ratio, GDP and the welfare ratio as described in the data section.
The corresponding regression results (see Additional file 1: Table S1) can be interpreted
as correlations between the instruments and local labor market conditions or organiza-
tional aspects that both affect the transition to employment. However, since none of the
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estimated coefficients is statistically significant, this can be interpreted in support of the
required orthogonality of the instruments from factors relevant for job finding, i.e. nei-
ther sanction strategy nor actual sanction rates at the local level systematically depend on
economic performance or the organizational set-up of the counseling process.
Moreover, we have regressed the instruments Z1 and Z2 on two variables reflecting the
caseload of welfare agencies (see Additional file 1: Table S2). The first variable relates the
number of UBII recipients registered at an agency to the full-time equivalent number of
overall staff in that agency. The second variable measures the ratio of UBII recipients to
the full-time equivalent number of agency staff responsible for labor market activation
or case management. Neither of the two coefficient estimates indicate, that a high or low
caseload causes the welfare agency to adopt a certain sanction approach.
Finally, we have checked the relationship between our instruments and other strategic
features of welfare agencies. In addition to the sanction strategy, the surveys conducted
at the agency level asked agency managers how important other activation elements are
for the strategy of their welfare agency. These activation elements include job creation
schemes, start-up subsidies, wage subsidies for employees and employers, the promo-
tion of professional qualifications, training of key skills for the activation process (like, for
example, job search training and internships), the support of disadvantaged young or dis-
abled UBII recipients, the supply of counseling services, the supply of child care facilities
and the supply of other social services. For each element, managers could answer on a Lik-
ert scale from 1 (not important) to 5 (very important). We use this information to define
a variable for each element, distinguishing between agencies for which the respective ele-
ment has a high strategic value and agencies for which this is not the case. The distinction
between the agencies is done at the median level of managers’ answers. When regressing
Z1 and Z2 on these variables, we find no indication that the sanction approach of a welfare
agency is systematically related to other strategic considerations (see Additional file 1:
Table S3 and Table S4). Given all this evidence, we conclude that both Z1 and Z2 satisfy
all requirements to be valid instruments for the identification of the LATEs we want to
estimate via Equations (1) and (2).
5 Empirical results
5.1 Descriptive evidence
Before we present and discuss the estimation results, we provide some descriptive
statistics on the sanction strategy (Z1) and the actually observed sanction rates (Z2)
Table 2 Description of the instruments: sanction strategy and sanction rate(a)
Full sample
4.34%
Z1 = 0 Z1 = 1 Z2 = 0 Z2 = 1
4.01% 5.75% 1.89% 6.54%
Sanctioned 500 167 137 530
Non-sanctioned 11,957 2,737 7,121 7,573
Total observations 15,361
aRemarks: Z1 refers to the sanction strategy of welfare agencies. Z1 = 0 denotes less strict agencies and Z1 = 1 denotes
frequently sanctioning agencies. Z2 refers to the actually observed sanction rates within welfare agencies. Z2 = 0 denotes
agencies with a sanction rate below the median and Z2 = 1 denotes agencies with a sanction rate above the median.
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in Table 2. The agency strategy of applying sanctions frequently is indeed highly cor-
related with the imposition of sanctions as reported by the individuals in the survey.
While in the full sample comprising all 154 welfare agencies 4.34% of the UBII recipients
were sanctioned between October 2006 and April 2007, the sanction rate is signif-
icantly larger for agencies that apply sanctions frequently as part of their activation
strategy. Within these agencies, the sanction rate amounts to 5.75%, compared to 4.01%
in the remaining agencies. This difference is remarkable, since the two variables con-
sidered are measured at different levels and the sanction strategy varies at the agency
level only. The difference is even larger when we look at the actually observed sanc-
tion rates. In agencies with a sanction rate above the median, 6.54% of UBII recipients
received a sanction, while for the other agencies we observe a sanction rate of 1.89% only.
Given these differences, both, Z1 and Z2, can be perceived to fulfill the second condi-
tion to identify a LATE: The probability of being sanctioned changes with the value of
the instrument.
Table 3 compares means of the variables used as covariates in the econometric analy-
sis for sanctioned and for non-sanctioned individuals and for those individuals registered
at agencies that frequently impose sanctions and for individuals registered at all other
agencies. In addition, p-values of t-tests on the equality of means are displayed to allow
for a meaningful discussion of differences. Male, younger and less qualified individ-
uals are most likely to have a benefit sanction imposed on them. Moreover, singles,
and, to a lesser degree, individuals without children are relatively frequently subject to
sanctions. Disabled persons and those with care obligations are less likely to receive a
sanction. There are also regional differences in sanction probabilities. In East Germany,
fewer sanctions are imposed compared to West Germany. However, no significant dif-
ferences in sanction probabilities exist with respect to the share of UBII recipients in
a region.
The middle part of Table 3 clearly shows that agencies with different sanction strategies
are quite similar with respect to the composition of their clients. Only small differences
are apparent concerning schooling achievement, household composition and migration
status. Slightly more singles, persons without children and persons with the lowest school
leaving certificate (secondary general school) are registered at agencies that frequently
impose sanctions than at the other agencies. Migrants are somewhat under-represented.
More important differences exist with respect to regional characteristics. In rural areas,
agencies seem to impose fewer sanctions than in urban districts. For East Germans, the
probability of being registered at an agency with a tough sanction policy is a little higher
than for West Germans. No clear picture arises with respect to the macroeconomic vari-
ables. While agencies that apply sanctions frequently are over-represented in regions
with a high welfare-to-population ratio, almost no difference exists with respect to the
unemployment ratio. We do not detect any statistically significant difference with respect
to GDP, either. Thus, the labor market state does not seem to determine the sanction
strategy of an agency, as is required for a strategy in order to be a valid instrument. Nev-
ertheless, the descriptive analysis indicates, that regional variables should be considered
in the estimation of the effect of benefit cuts. This is also true when using instrument
Z2. As can be seen from the right-hand side of Table 3, differences between agencies
with Z2 = 0 and Z2 = 1 are somewhat larger than between agencies with Z1 = 0
and Z1 = 1.
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Table 3 Descriptive statistics(a)
S = 0 S = 1 p-val. Z1 = 0 Z1 = 1 p-val. Z2 = 0 Z2 = 1 p-val.
Gender
Male 0.459 0.565 0.000 0.464 0.464 0.973 0.465 0.463 0.821
Age
18–24 0.203 0.381 0.000 0.210 0.217 0.422 0.209 0.213 0.469
25–34 0.207 0.258 0.002 0.209 0.208 0.863 0.205 0.213 0.264
35–44 0.211 0.174 0.023 0.209 0.207 0.798 0.210 0.208 0.726
45–57 0.379 0.187 0.000 0.371 0.368 0.751 0.376 0.366 0.208
Schooling
Secondary general school 0.443 0.505 0.001 0.441 0.466 0.013 0.412 0.475 0.000
Intermediate secondary school 0.338 0.262 0.000 0.338 0.319 0.045 0.376 0.297 0.000
University entrance diploma 0.160 0.123 0.010 0.160 0.154 0.467 0.156 0.161 0.332
Other or missing 0.059 0.109 0.000 0.061 0.061 0.939 0.056 0.066 0.006
Migration background
Migrant 0.247 0.258 0.539 0.252 0.231 0.018 0.223 0.270 0.000
Household size
1 person 0.345 0.402 0.003 0.341 0.376 0.000 0.323 0.370 0.000
2 persons 0.278 0.229 0.006 0.280 0.257 0.011 0.295 0.258 0.000
3 or more persons 0.377 0.369 0.666 0.379 0.367 0.233 0.383 0.371 0.155
Number of children
No children 0.611 0.651 0.040 0.609 0.629 0.040 0.610 0.615 0.548
1 child 0.214 0.201 0.425 0.216 0.203 0.140 0.223 0.205 0.006
2 or more children 0.175 0.148 0.075 0.176 0.167 0.293 0.167 0.180 0.030
Obstacles to employment
Disabled person 0.105 0.054 0.000 0.103 0.101 0.766 0.098 0.106 0.119
Care obligation 0.033 0.019 0.055 0.033 0.030 0.488 0.035 0.030 0.065
Status before receipt of welfare benefits
(Minor) employment 0.322 0.396 0.000 0.326 0.325 0.943 0.319 0.331 0.109
Number of previous unemployment spells
0 or 1 0.389 0.370 0.340 0.387 0.393 0.541 0.391 0.385 0.418
2 or 3 0.370 0.379 0.624 0.373 0.358 0.130 0.364 0.376 0.150
4 or more 0.183 0.196 0.384 0.183 0.187 0.606 0.188 0.180 0.209
Missing 0.058 0.054 0.644 0.057 0.062 0.317 0.056 0.059 0.428
Regional information
City district 0.300 0.337 0.040 0.289 0.355 0.000 0.283 0.318 0.000
East Germany 0.253 0.153 0.000 0.244 0.267 0.009 0.369 0.140 0.000
Unemployment ratio (high) 0.255 0.160 0.000 0.247 0.263 0.074 0.366 0.147 0.000
GDP (high) 0.286 0.361 0.000 0.291 0.280 0.216 0.209 0.360 0.000
Welfare ratio (high) 0.284 0.289 0.779 0.276 0.323 0.000 0.281 0.287 0.404
Current welfare spell
Months in welfare before 10/2006 12,437 10,927 0.000 12,356 12,440 0.660 12.806 11.982 0.000
Start after 10/2006 or missing 0.183 0.178 0.774 0.186 0.170 0.047 0.183 0.182 0.912
Observations 14,694 667 15,361 12,457 2,904 15,361 7,258 8,103 15,361
aRemarks: S = 0 denotes non-sanctioned individuals and S = 1 denotes sanctioned individuals. Z1 refers to the sanction
strategy of welfare agencies. Z1 = 0 denotes less strict agencies and Z1 = 1 denotes frequently sanctioning agencies. Z2 refers
to the actually observed sanction rates within welfare agencies. Z2 = 0 denotes welfare agencies with a sanction rate below
the median and Z2 = 1 denotes agencies with a sanction rate above the median. The p-values derive from t-tests on the
equality of means of the displayed variables for S = 0 and S = 1, for Z1 = 0 and Z1 = 1 and for Z2 = 0 and Z2 = 1, respectively.
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Table 4 displays the mean employment rates for the first six months after the (hypothet-
ical) sanction date. It distinguishes between sanctioned and non-sanctioned individuals
registered either at agencies that frequently impose sanctions or at agencies that do not.
The share of persons taking up employment and thereby leaving the welfare system
increases over time in all subgroups. For example, 5.91% of the non-sanctioned persons
who are registered at agencies that do not follow a tough sanction strategy (Z1 = 0)
have left the welfare system for employment one month after the (hypothetical) sanction
date. This share increases steadily and amounts to 10.59% six months after the (hypothet-
ical) sanction. For the sanctioned group in the same agencies, the outflow rate rises from
2.60% to 8.80%. When looking at agencies that frequently impose sanctions (Z1 = 1),
the increase in the employment probability of sanctioned individuals is even more pro-
nounced. Outflow rates start at 2.40% in the first month and rise to more than 20% in
the final month of the observation period. For the alternative instrument Z2 and individ-
uals who are sanctioned in agencies with a sanction rate above the median (Z2 = 1), we
observe a more modest increase in employment rates from 2.45% to 12.26%. Neverthe-
less, as in the case of Z1, this subgroup has the largest employment share at the end of the
observation period.
5.2 Estimation results
Before turning to the estimates of the LATE, we will discuss the first stage regression
results (see Additional file 1: Table S5 for the corresponding coefficient estimates). The
instrument Z1 (sanction strategy) has a significantly positive effect on the sanction prob-
ability. Individuals registered at agencies that frequently impose sanctions have a 2.86
percentage point higher probability of getting a sanction than individuals registered at
the other agencies. Given the low average sanction rate on average, this is a large effect.
The effect is also large in absolute terms, when compared to the coefficients of the other
covariates included in the model. The F-statistic for significance of the instrument Z1 in
the first stage regression is 10.64. It is thus close to the threshold value of 10 suggested by
1997 to indicate a potential weak instrument problem.11 To investigate whether a weak
Table 4 Description of the outcome variable self-sufficient employment
Z1 Z2
Z1 = 0 Z1 = 1 Z2 = 0 Z2 = 1
S = 0 S = 1 S = 0 S = 1 S = 0 S = 1 S = 0 S = 1
Month
1 0.0591 0.0260 0.0617 0.0240 0.0524 0.0292 0.0664 0.0245
2 0.0648 0.0460 0.0745 0.0479 0.0588 0.0511 0.0739 0.0453
3 0.0736 0.0560 0.0811 0.0898 0.0653 0.0511 0.0841 0.0679
4 0.0840 0.0640 0.0891 0.1257 0.0729 0.0657 0.0964 0.0830
5 0.0965 0.0740 0.1023 0.1677 0.0829 0.0876 0.1114 0.1000
6 0.1059 0.0880 0.1155 0.2036 0.0932 0.0949 0.1212 0.1226
Remarks: The outcome variable is defined to be 1 if an individual is employed and does not receive welfare benefits
anymore. Otherwise, the variable is 0. The variable is displayed for the first six months after the (hypothetical) sanction date.
S = 0 denotes non-sanctioned individuals, and S = 1 denotes sanctioned individuals. Z1 refers to the sanction strategy of
welfare agencies. Z1 = 0 denotes less strict agencies, and Z1 = 1 denotes frequently sanctioning agencies. Z2 refers to the
observed sanction rates within welfare agencies. Z2 = 0 denotes welfare agencies with a sanction rate below the median
across all 154 sampled agencies, and Z2 = 1 denotes agencies with a sanction rate above the median.
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instrument problem is in fact present, we use the second instrument Z2, which differen-
tiates between agencies with a sanction rate above and below the median level. In this
case, we estimate an even larger impact on the individual sanction probability in the first
stage regression. The coefficient of the instrument Z2 is highly significant and amounts
to 4.78 percentage points. The F-statistic is 122.09 and thus considerably larger than the
threshold value. Therefore, besides giving further insight into the effectiveness of sanc-
tions, Z2 also allows us to assess how precisely the sanction effect is estimated using
instrument Z1.
Based on Z1, the upper part of Table 5 provides the estimation results for the LATE
of a sanction on employment in the first six months after the (hypothetical) benefit
cut. The positive coefficients of the sanction variable reveal that the outflow from wel-
fare to employment increases due to an imposed sanction, even after controlling for
a number of individual and regional characteristics.12 During the first three months,
the effect is modest and not statistically significant. In the fourth month, we observe
a large increase in the outflow rate. The effect becomes statistically significant in the
fifth month and amounts to 0.6766 at the end of the observation period. This figure
indicates that a benefit cut induced by a change of the sanction regime increases the
probability that affected individuals will leave the welfare system within six months
after the benefit cut by nearly 68 percentage points. It thus constitutes a considerable
sanction effect.
Considerable effects of benefit sanctions have also been identified in the relevant empir-
ical literature for other countries. Van den Berg et al. (2004), for example, find that the
probability of an average 25-year-old Dutch welfare recipient in the city of Rotterdam of
leaving the welfare system within two years increases from 66% to 91% if a sanction is
imposed after 6 months of being on welfare. For a 50-year-old, the corresponding prob-
ability increases from 29% to 54%. Focusing on the same labor market but a more recent
time period, van der Klaauw and van Ours (2013) estimate increases in the exits rates of
21% for males and 47% for females. They explain the reduction in effects compared to
van den Berg et al. (2004) by a more intensive use of sanctions in the period of analysis.
Similar high levels of the effects of benefit sanctions are found by Abbring et al. (2005):
they report increases in the re-employment rates of males by up to 61% and even by 98%
for females in the metal industry. Comparable to that, Lalive et al. (2005) analyzing the
Table 5 Estimated sanction effects
Month 1 2 3 4 5 6
Sanction 0.0092 0.1347 0.1689 0.4475 0.5604∗ 0.6766∗∗∗
(based on Z1) (0.2015) (0.2383) (0.2436) (0.2795) (0.2927) (0.2607)
Sanction 0.2802∗∗ 0.2402∗∗ 0.3594∗∗∗ 0.4496∗∗∗ 0.4950∗∗∗ 0.5802∗∗∗
(based on Z2) (0.1124) (0.1216) (0.1249) (0.1353) (0.1437) (0.1396)
Observations 15,361
Remarks: The upper part of the table refers to the estimation in which Z1 (sanction strategy of welfare agencies) is used as
instrument; the lower part of the table refers to the estimation in which Z2 (observed sanction rates within welfare agencies)
is used as instrument. The dependent variable in each estimation and for each month is defined to be 1 if an individual is
employed and no longer receives welfare benefits. Otherwise, the variable is 0. Displayed are the estimated sanction effects
and standard errors in brackets. The results refer to the first six months after the (hypothetical) sanction date. ∗∗∗denotes
p < 0.01, ∗∗denotes p < 0.05, and ∗denotes p < 0.1. The standard errors take into account clustering at the agency level.
Detailed estimation results for Z1 and Z2 including all covariates are displayed in Additional file 1: Table S6 and Table S7.
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effects of benefit sanctions in Switzerland estimate an increase in the exit rate to employ-
ment by 45%; 25.2% of the effect results from the ex-ante effect (the effect of the warning
to get sanctioned) and 19.8% from the ex-post effect of the actually imposed sanction.
In a follow-up study, Arni et al. (2013) confirm these findings: they report an increase in
unemployment exit by 31.9% (with 15.9% attributed to the effect of a warning) but more
importantly an increase of the exit rate to non-employment by 116.0%.
Since we estimate the LATE, the level of the identified effects is in line with expec-
tations. The LATE depicts the effect for those, who get sanctioned after a tightening of
the sanction policy in the welfare agency. It can thus be interpreted as an estimate of the
effect of an intensified use of sanctions. In contrast to looking at the effect of a sanction
for the average welfare recipient (who is in focus in other empirical studies), we estimate
the sanction effect for a more narrowly defined group of persons. Our results show that
this subgroup, which has not been regarded in the literature so far, reacts even stronger
to sanctions than existing studies found for average sanctioned individuals. There-
fore, we conclude that intensifying the use of sanctions is an effective tool to increase
employment.
The estimated effects, however, suffer from large standard errors. We therefore use
instrument Z2 to check for robustness. As can be seen from the lower part of Table 5, the
results based on this instrument reveal a similar effectiveness of sanctions as obtained by
using instrument Z1, but results are more precisely estimated as reflected by the lower
standard errors13. Again, we observe an increasing sanction effect during the observation
period. In the first three months, the estimated effects are larger than in the case of Z1
and already statistically significant. At the end of the observation period, the effects are
somewhat lower compared with Z1, but highly significant. Six months after the (hypo-
thetical) benefit cut, the probability of taking up employment for a welfare recipient who
is at risk of being sanctioned increases by about 58 percentage points (0.5802), when the
welfare agency decides to increase the sanction rate from below to above themedian level,
thereby imposing a sanction on the individual. The effect is in the same range as the effect
measured by instrument Z1. Given the similarity of the estimates between the two instru-
mental variables, we conclude that our estimation approach does not suffer from a weak
instrument problem. The sanction effect is of considerable size.
The smaller size of the coefficient for the treatment variable after six months in the esti-
mation approach using Z2 rather than Z1 as the instrumental variable is not necessarily
due to the lower empirical variation in the instrumental variable. The LATE is identified
only for the so-called compliers, who receive a sanction, when the instrument changes its
value from 0 to 1. Having defined two different instruments, we also consider two differ-
ent groups of compliers. One group is affected by a change in the sanction strategy of the
welfare agency, whereas the other is affected by a change in the observed sanction rate.
Since both groups are not identical, it cannot be expected that the estimated LATEs are
identical.
5.3 Robustness checks
In addition to the empirical estimates presented above, we have also estimated a
number of models in order to check the robustness of the findings. A first issue
considered refers to the specification of the first stage regressions. Additional file 1:
Table S8 and Table S9 provide coefficient estimates of five further model specifications.
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These specifications differ with respect to the inclusion of labor market history
information, regional information and information regarding individual’s qualifica-
tion. The results indicate that the coefficient estimates of the instrumental vari-
ables are consistently estimated and are almost identical across the different model
specifications.
Corresponding results for the second stage regressions are reported in Additional
file 1: Table S10 and Table S11. The point estimates of the treatment effects differ
slightly across specifications, but are of comparable magnitude and significance. All esti-
mates indicate a substantial sanction effect, further supporting the validity of the chosen
instruments.
Another robustness check conducted regards the hypothetical sanction dates. Alter-
natively to using a uniform distribution, we constructed hypothetical sanction dates
for the non-sanctioned individuals by imaging the observed distribution of sanction
dates among the sanctioned individuals. In our sample, 11.54% of all sanctions were
imposed in October 2006, 8.25% in November 2006, 21.14% in December 2006, 26.84%
in January 2007, 19.19% in February 2007, 10.94% in March 2007, and 2.10% in April
2007. When randomly assigning hypothetical sanction dates according to this distri-
bution to the non-sanctioned individuals, our estimation results confirm a sanction
effect as substantial as in the case of a uniform distribution of hypothetical sanction
dates.
6 Conclusion
Recent studies investigating the effect of sanctions imposed on unemployment insur-
ance benefit and welfare benefit recipients show that benefit cuts substantially increase
employment uptake among the sanctioned persons. This evidence at the individual level
raises the question whether welfare agencies should intensify the use of sanctions to
decrease welfare dependency rates and to increase employment rates on a larger scale. To
answer this question, we estimate the effect of a sanction on those individuals who receive
a benefit cut if their welfare agency decides to tighten its sanction regime. This effect has
not been analyzed in the literature so far.
We use a unique data set for Germany. The data set shows that benefit sanc-
tions are not imposed uniformly, when an individual does not comply with his or
her duties during the activation process. Rather, there is substantial discretion at the
agency level determining whether a sanction is applied or not. While some agencies
frequently impose sanctions, the policy of others is less tough. We use these dif-
ferences in sanction strategies and rates across 154 welfare agencies in Germany as
instrumental variables to estimate the effect of a benefit cut on the individual employ-
ment probability. Specifically, we estimate the effect of a sanction on those individ-
uals who are not sanctioned by an agency with a cautious sanction policy, but who
would be sanctioned if the agency decided to impose sanctions more frequently. This
LATE can be interpreted as an estimate of the effectiveness of an intensified use of
sanctions.
Our results show that the intensified use of sanctions can be quite effective in increasing
employment rates. A sanction increases the probability of the affected compliers to leave
the welfare system for employment within six months after the benefit cut by 58 to 68
percentage points. Therefore, we conclude that a more intensive use of benefit cuts by
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welfare agencies can contribute to making the labor market activation of UBII recipients
more effective by increasing the transition rate from welfare to work.
Endnotes
1Compact overviews of a number of different unemployment insurance systems of
selected OECD countries with consideration of benefit sanctions are provided by Grubb
(2000) and Venn (2012).
2Most studies concentrate on unemployment insurance benefit recipients, but there
also exists some evidence for welfare recipients. For studies analyzing the effects on
unemployment benefit recipients see, for example, Abbring et al. (2005) for the
Netherlands, Lalive et al. (2005) and Arni et al. (2013) for Switzerland, Svarer (2011) for
Denmark, or Müller and Steiner (2008) and Hofmann (2012) for Germany. Empirical
analyses for welfare recipients are provided by van den Berg et al. (2004) for the
Netherlands, Grogger and Karoly (2005) or Blank and Haskins (2001) for the US, besides
others.
3This regional variation in sanction rates is not specific to Germany, but has been
reported in the literature as well. For example, Lalive et al. (2005) report different
sanction intensities across Swiss cantons.
4The exploitation of regional information within an instrumental variable setting for
the evaluation of labor market policies has recently also been suggested by Frölich and
Lechner (2010).
5At the beginning of 2005, UBII cash payments amounted to EUR 345 in West
Germany and to EUR 331 in East Germany. Meanwhile, the level of UBII in East
Germany was adjusted to the Western level and UBII was slightly raised in both parts to
compensate for inflation.
6We excluded 811 persons with more than one sanction, 989 individuals with a
sanction before the sampling date, 181 UBII recipients with a sanction in a former UBII
spell and 489 observations with missing information.
7We dropped 845 individuals aged 15 to 17, 2,116 persons aged 58 to 64 and 3,771
UBII recipients who are employed.
8In some cases, UBII recipients appeal against the imposition of a sanction. Social
courts then have to decide on the legitimacy of the sanction. The average duration of
litigations in these instances was 13.7 months in 2007 (see Statistisches Bundesamt
2009). This period is considerably longer than our observation period of six months
after the (hypothetical) imposition of the sanction. Therefore, we do not expect that a
potential appeal of sanctioned survey participant against the benefit cut affects his or
her behavior in our observation window. Since the sanction is in force despite the appeal,
there is the same incentive to increase job search effort as in the case without an appeal.
9Figures according to the German Federal Statistical Office and the FEA.
10In this specification, we control for sex, age, schooling, migration background,
household size, number of children, obstacles to employment, labor market status
before welfare receipt, previous unemployment spells, regional information and the
duration of the current welfare spell. The duration of the welfare spell is measured as the
number of months on benefits before the sampling date. Due to the time span between
sampling and interview date, not all individuals report a starting date of welfare receipt
before the sampling date. Some left and re-entered the welfare system during fall and
winter 2006/2007 and thus report a starting date after the sampling date. For these
individuals the duration variable is set to 0. An additional dummy variable takes these
late starting dates into account.
11We rely on this rule of thumb since we cannot apply the tests proposed by Stock and
Yogo (2005) because we use only one instrument and do not assume homoscedastic
errors but allow for clustering at the agency level.
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12Additional file 1: Table S6 depicts the detailed estimation results including all
considered covariates.
13Detailed results including all considered covariates are displayed in Additional file 1:
Table S7.
Additional file
: Appendix. Table S1. Regression of Z1 and Z2 on organizational and regional variables. Table S2.
Regression of Z1 and Z2 on caseload variables. Table S3. Regression of Z1 on strategical variables. Table S4.
Regression of Z2 on strategical variables. Table S5. First stage results based on instruments Z1 and Z2. Table S6.
Detailed estimation results for sanction effects based on instrument Z1. Table S7. Detailed estimation results for
sanction effects based on instrument Z2. Table S8. Sensitivity analysis for the first son based on instrument Z1.
Table S9. Sensitivity analysis for the first stage regression based on instrument Z2. Table S10. Sensitivity analysis for
the second stage regression based on instrument Z1 in month 6. Table S11. Sensitivity analysis for the second stage
regression based on instrument Z2 in month 6. Figure S1. Sampled agencies. Figure S2. Sanction strategies.
Figure S3. Sanction rates.
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